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The QAL Y --quality adjusted lire years- approach assumes tbat each additional 
QAL y has the same social value. The implications of tms approach regarding 
distributive equity have been criticised. In this paper we identif)r different distributive 
preferences held by society. examining which restrictions need to be imposed in the 
Social Welfare Function (SWF) in arder that tbis function can represent the mentioned 
preferences. Furthermore, we propase a particular SWF that a110ws us to colleet 
different degrees oí aversion to inequality, depending on the QAL y gains being 
analysed. The results oí an experiment whose objective is to obtain a first empirical 
approach to the SWF are presented. 
RESUMEN 
El modelo QALY -afias de vida ajustados por calidad-- considera que cada QALY 
adicional tiene el mismo valor social. Las implicaciones de este enfoque en cuanto a la 
equidad distributiva han sido muy criticadas. En este articulo se identifican diferentes 
preferencias distributivas presentes en la sociedad, identificando las propiedades que 
debe tener la Función de Bienestar Social (FBS) para éstas preferencias puedan ser 
representadas. Además, se propone una FBS concreta que permite incorporar diferentes 
grados de aversión a la desigualdad dependiendo del número de QAL Y s individuales 
obtenidos. También se muestran los resultados de un experimento cuyo objetivo es 
obtener una primera aproximación de la FBS. 
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1 Introduction 
Cost-effectiveness analysis is a methodology tbat facilitates social decision-
making in the allocation of scarce resources. With respect tú its application 
to the health eare sector, an output measure is needed tú compare the effects 
the different health care prograrns have Oil people's health. The QALY -
quality-adjusted life year- has been propased as an adequate measure since 
it combines quantity and quality of life iuto oue single indexo Given that 
the QALY approach i8 based Oil the Utility Theory (e.g., Torrance, 1976 and 
Pliskin et al., 1980), cost--effectiveness analysis i8 normally called cost-utility 
analysis when the effects are assessed in QALYs. 
Calculating CQst per QALY, it i8 possible tú compare different health 
care programs in terros of efficiency. Follawing cost-utility analysis, the 
best allocation of health resources, is that which maximises the community's 
health obtained from the unweighted sum of individual QALYs. In this 
way, each additional QALY is implicitly considered to have the sarue social 
value, independent of the characteristics of the patient and the number of 
QALYs received. We will refer to this unweighted sum as the aggregated 
QALY model (AQM) to distinguish it from the QALY mode] which focuses 
on getting individual QALYs, previous to the aggregation process. 
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Despite a few exceptions, such as the age of the patients, the egalitarian 
aspect of the AQM has a very high degree of social acceptance. However, 
not considering distributive effects incites greater controversy. Given that 
a QALY is always assigned the sarue social value, giving many QALY s to 
few people will have the sarue social value as giving few QALYs to many 
people, as long as the total number of QAL Y s given remains constant. Sorne 
empirical studies (e.g., Olsen, 1994, Johannesson and Gerdtham, 1996, Nord, 
1996 and Dolan, 1998) have shown that when the general public is asked to 
allocate health resources, it not only has health gains --efficiency- in mind, 
but also the way in wmch these are distributed aruong the population ~ 
distributive equity. By doing so, society may be willing to give up a certain 
degree of e:fficiency -total munber of QALY s- through obtaining a more 
equitable distribution. Therefore both concepts must be included in the 
social assessment of health care programs. 
Theoretically, the concept of distributive equity has been incorporated 
into QALY literature through two lines of research. One has its beginnings in 
modern welfare economics (Wagstaff, 1991), and the other in multi-attribute 
utility theory (Bleichrodt, 1997). Both approaches propose variations in the 
aggregated QALY model wmch allow us incorporate the trade-off between 
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efficiency and distributive equity. Bleichrodt suggests to weaken the addi-
tivity condition underlying the model and formulates, under uncertainty, a 
multiplicative model defined on individual QALY gains. Starting with the 
parameters of the multiplicative function it is possible to analyse the ex-
tent to which society is willing to sacrifice efficiency in order to obtain more 
equitable distribution. 
Wagstaff, while not giving up the additivity condition, propases an isoe-
lastic social welfare function inspired in the function established by Atkinson 
(l970). In this case, the distributive preferences are introduced by designat-
ing decreasing social values to each additional QALY received by the same 
individual. Dolan (1998) also analyses the properties of this function and its 
application in the allocation of ~ealth resources. Another way to introduce 
this decreasing social value in an additive functíon is through using a "social 
weight rate" as propased by OJsen (1994). Both additive propositions will be 
analysed in greater detail in the third section. We will follow this approach 
because it allows liS tú use customary concepts in the inequality literature 
and it has been used previously in empirical studies. In this way our research 
can better be compared with previous empirical findings. 
Parallel to the theoretical debate, sorne empirical studies have focused on 
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assessing the parameters of the social welfare function (SWF) that best fit 
with sampled social preferences -for example, Johannensson and Gerdtham 
(1996) estimate the shape of the SWF and Olsen (1994) estimates the social 
weight rate. However, these studies do not consider the possibility that the 
parameters can vary as a function of the number oI QALYs gained or it lS 
taken into account in a lirnited way -few and similar gains are considered. 
However, there rnight be a stronger preference for a more equitable distri-
bution when individual gains are very great than when they are small. In 
this case, the parameters will not be constant. Furthermore, there could be 
preferences to concentrate gains when a small number of individual QALY s 
are obtained. There is sorne empirical evidence that show the existence of 
such preferences. For example, Pinto and Lopez (1998) show that people 
prefer concentrate when they compare small quality oI life increments with 
life saving treatments. AIso, Choudry et al. (1997) report that people prefer 
a program that increases life--expectancy in 20 years to 500 people that a 
program that increases life-expectancy in 1 year to 10 000 people. In other 
words, it is possible to prefer substantial improvements for a few individuals 
to "insignificant" improvements for many. Therefore, it is necessary to pro-
pose more flexible functional form of the SWF which, as opposed to those 
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which have been proposed before, allow liS to describe a possible change in 
the pattern oí preferences. Tbis lS the primary aim of tbis study. 
In following section, we identify some conditions, frequently used in wel-
fare economics under certainty, which are compatible with the AQM and with 
more flexible models. In section 3, we propose two measures wbich will al-
low liS to caJculate the inequality aversion degree. Based on these inequality 
aversion measures, tbe differences between the two additive S'WFs, previously 
mentioned, are analysed. We finisb tbe section by proposing a specific SWF 
that generalises the SWF underlying the AQM and lets liS introduce different 
distributive preferences. Section 4 shows the results of an experiment we car-
ried out whose aim is to construct a SWF that best fits the social preferences 
of tbe respondents and to anaJyse whether the degree of inequality aversion 
is independent of tbe provided gains or noto Section 5 discusses tbe results 
obtained. FinaJly, section 6 contains concludings remarks. 
2 Derivation of the Social Welfare Function 
The aggregated QALY model, and sorne extensions that try to introduce 
distributive considerations) can be derived fram an additive SVVF where social 
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welfare is defined over the individual health gains. In arder ta generate tbis 
utilitarían SWF, we must establish sorne conditions wbich will be presented 
after a short notational introduction -see Rodríguez and Pinto (1999) for a 
more extensive theoretical exposition. 
The output of a given health care program is defined as a distributíon of 
health gains, measured as the number of QALY s, the program provides to 
a given population. Let n ;::: 3 the populatíon síze and let T E ?R~ the set 
of possíble outputs that results froro the implementation of different health 
care programB. An element of T is defined as a vector, r = (tI, ... ) tnL 
where ti E tR+ ---i = 1, ... , n- indicates the number of QALYs individual 
i receives froro the programo We assume without loss of generality that for 
each individual the possible gain of QALYs is non-negative. That is to say, 
we assume that there are no states worse than death. 
The next step is to establish a criterion of social choice which allows us 
to order all the elements of T in an unambiguous rating. In arder to do this, 
we consider that social preference relationship is complete and transitive -
a weak order. Then, it can be represented by a value function -SWF-
defined over T) that we denote by W (T). Therefore, this function represent 
society's preferences. In addition the SWF is considered to depend positively 
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on individual QALYs ~VV (.) increases in t· (P t . 
• are o asSumptlOU). 
It would S8em appropriate tú consider that the soc,'a!" " prelerences .Lor two 
different distributions of health, which differ only in the health . . f provIslOn o a 
couple of randam individuaJs, depend only on QALYs received by those two 
individuals (independence assumption). 
These assumptions allows lIS tú define an additive SWF in the following 
way vV (T) = i~ Ui(ti ), where Ui i8 a positive monotonic transforrnation de-
fined aver ti, that reflects the interpersonal comparisons made by the society 
[see Debreu (1960) and Keeney and Raiffa (1976)J. 
Another frequently used assumption i8 that of anonymity (Bleichrodt, 
1996). This assumption tells liS that if a health distr¡'but¡'o . . n 18 a permutatlOll 
of another distributioll, then both distributions must have the sarue social 
value. Based on trus assumption and a scaling assumption, we can define the 
SWF as, 
n 
W (7) = I: u(ti ) 
i=1 
where u (ti) indicates the social utility of ti gain. 
Function W (T) i8 compatible with different social preferences depending 
on the functional form it acquires u( ti). Suppose that u(t) . t' i lS a con muous 
and twice differentiable function. G' h ' ¡ven t at u (i;) defined as du(ti)jdti is the 
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(social) marginal utility, it can be interpreted as the social weight designated 
to each additional unit of t received by individual i (e.g., Cowel1, 1995). The 
reason for the latter affirmation is as follows. If a health care program pro-
duces a small change in the everyone's health, (6t1 , ••. , 6tn ), social welfare 
will rise, 6W = t u'(t;)6ti . Therefore U'(ti) act as a system of weights 
;=1 
when sununing the effects of the program over the whole population. 
The SWF that underlies the AQM is reached immediately if we impose a 
restriction on the marginal utilities. Given that for this model an additional 
QALY always has the sarue social vaIue, d(ti} must be constant indepen-
dently of the value of ti. Under this assumption, u(1)(td = ti -----or any posi-
tive linear transformation- and the SWF can be defined as W(1) (T) = t ti 
i=1 
In order to introduce the existence of a temporal discount rate we can simply 
suppose that ti are QALYs that have already been discounted. 
3 Distributive considerations 
The number of QALYs provided by each health care program is indisputably 
a variable of interest, but not the only one. The distributive effects associated 
with each program are another variable that may be considered relevant by 
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society. In tbis case, each additional QALY received by the same individual 
can have different weíghts and, therefore, u/(ti ) can vary depending on the 
value of ti. If we suppose that society prefers more equitable distributions -
positive inequality aversion-, the weight of each additional QALY received 
by individual i, will decrease as the number oI QALYs received increases. In 
this case, Ull (ti) defined as dd (t¡)jdti ls negative ---u(ti ) ls a concave function. 
If, on the other hand, there are preferences to concentrate gains -negative 
inequality aversion-, then ull(t¡) is posítive or, equivalently, u(t¡) is a convex 
function. 
The degree of aversion to inequality can be obtained through some mea-
sure that reflecting the marginal utility variation in the presence of variations 
in the quantity of (individual) QALYs. Tbis measure allows to discover the 
extent to which society is willing to exchange efficiency for equity. There 
are two measures wbich are particularly appropriate, given the cardinality 
of u(ti ) -the expression U"(ti ) is not adequate because it variant to positive 
linear transformation of u(ti ). One ls a measure of absolute ínequality aver-
sion, ()a (ti) = -U'/(ti)ju/(t.), and the other is a measure ofrelative inequality 
aversion ---or th~ elasticity of marginal utility-, ()r (ti) = -ti [UIl(ti}/u'(ti)J. 
These measures have there origins in Arrow (1965) and Pratts (1964) aver-
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sion to risk measures. The latter tells us in what percentage the weight of 
each person, u'(ti ), is reduced when the number of QALYs is increased by 1 
percent. 
Given that u'(t¡) is always positive, both measures are positive if society 
prefers to distribute health gams, they are negative if there are preferences 
for concentration, and they are equal to zero if society only has efficiency 
in mind (AQM). On the other hand, a constant ()a indicates that in the 
presence of equal changes in the patient health level -in tbis case number 
of QALY 8-, the weight is modified in the same proportíon, independently 
ofthe value of ti, However, a constant ()r reveals that the weight is modified 
in the same proportion in the presence of equal proportional changes. 
Inequality aversion measures allow us to analyse those normative pos-
tulates that underlie different SWFs. As rnentioned in the introductíon, in 
the literature on QALYs, under certainty, two ways are normally used for 
including distributive preferences starting from an additive SWF. Wagstaff 
proposes an isoelastic SWF that along with the anonymity assumption de-
fines U(ti) as 
if é /1 
if é ~ 1. 
Olsen proposes using a social weight rate, 1/ (1 + r). when it comes to 
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assessing each additional QALY. In this case, U(3)(ti) = t [1/ (1 + r)f. We 
;=1 
assume that discounted QALYs are used, otherwise therate 1/ (1 + r) reflects 
the social weight rate and the temporal discount rate in an indistinguishable 
way. Given that we have considered that ti E !R+, the continuous version of 
U(3) i8 expressed as follows, 
It is obviou8 to see that positive (negative) E and r values correspond to 
concave (convex) utility functions and, therefore, it would describe a positive 
(negative) inequalityaversion. If E and r are equal to zero it would indicated 
that maxirnising the number of QALYs is the only consideration of interest, 
therefore, U(2) = U(3) = u(1). 
The main difference between the two functions is determined by their 
degree of inequality aversion. While the weights designated by U(2) increase 
in the same proportion in the presence of identical proportional changes -
decreasing ea and constant er - the weights designated by U(3) increase in the 
same proportion in the presence of equal changes in the level --<!onstant ea 
and increasing er . Therefore, the theoretical application of one or the other 
function requires normative postulates. 
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Besides normative postulates, it is interesting to know whether the SWF 
which best reflects social preferences coincides with any of the aforementioned 
functions or, otherwise, what properties characterise this new S\iVF. We ought 
to bear in mind that if there are different degrees of aversion to inequality 
in social decision-making depending on the value of t, then neither of the 
two previously mentioned functions would be valido In this case it would be 
necessary to apply more flexible functions. 
In this context, it would be suitable to define a social utility function, 
denoted as u(4) (ti), that generalises the aboYe mentioned formulations in the 
sense that the these can be obtained as a particular case of u(4). A function 
that ful:fils these requirements can be defined as, 
This function can have concave or convex sections depending on the value 
of the parameters. This is an important property because it allows us to 
represent social preferences with positive and negative inequality aversion in 
the same function and, therefore, it permits us to represent a change in the 
preferences pattern. In addition, if {0::1, a3} = 1 and 0::2 = 0, then, U(4) = U(l): 
if 0::1 = 1/0'.3 and 0::2 = O, then, u(4) = U(2)¡ finally, if al = -1/0::2 and a3 = O, 
U(4) will be a linear transformation of u(3). 
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4 Experiment 
the first meeting the airo of the study was explained to the participants. Af-
The airo of this experiment is to obtain a first approach to the function U(ti) ter that, they filIed out a pilot questionnaire so they could becaroe familiar 
and, therefore, to the SVVF _ In arder to do this, a set oí health gains which we with the kind of questions they would be asked at the second meeting. 
consider representative ex ante are assessed. Then the functional forro that The second meeting was carried out in clifferent sessions with an average 
best fits these assessments i8 sought. Once u(ti ) i8 obtained, its properties of five participants per session. Each Olle was shown different health care 
are analysed, focusing on the influence that distributive effects have on the programs that were all directed at 20-year-old patients. By doing so we 
assessment of any health gain. Health gains were measured in years in fuIl tried to isolate the effect that patient age can have on social decision-making, 
health in order to make the task easier for the people being surveyed. thereby avoiding each individual presupposing different ages. Each program 
The Person Trade-off (PTO) technique was used to designate social values consisted of a different pajr (etp), where p is the number of patients who 
to individual health gains. In short, this technique consists of presenting the benefit frOll its application, and t is the health gain, rneasured in years in 
person being surveyed with different allocations of numbers oI patients and full health, that each one receives. For each program, the participant had to 
the health gains that they receive and then the surveyed person must say say how many 20-year-old patients, p*, would have to receive a lo-years life 
which allocations are considered equally preferred (Nord, 1992). increase in order to make him indifferent between both programs. In other 
words, once t and p have been fixed, they must give a p* value such that the 
4.1 Design (t,p) and (lO,p') allocations are equally preferred -PTO technique. Given 
The experiment was conducted with 61 undergraduate students -21 Eco- the Iact that in the pilot questionnaire we detected that the parlicipants 
nomics students, 20 Political Science students and 20 Law students. The stu- had sorne difficulties when trying to choose a concrete number of years, it 
, 
dents were pajd approximately $16 for their participation. The experiment was decided to use the "choice-bracketing" to calculate the p* value. Tills 
consisted of three meetings with the participants on three different days. At mechanism consists oI approaching the value through a series of successive 
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questions where it is always necessary to choose between two allocations -
see appendix. Sometimes the designed choice-bracketing doesn't allow to get 
an exact value for p* but an intervaL In this case we take the intermediate 
value of that intervalo 
Our working hypothesis is that preferences for distributive effects can 
vary depending on the life-years increase that each patient receives. In order 
to test too, the participants assessed five different time increases: 1, 2, 5, 20 
and 50 years. The number of patient, p, was selected in such a way that all of 
the programs provided the same totallife-years increase and, therefore, they 
have the same value for the AQM. Accordingly, they Illise8Sed the following 
programs' (1,100), (2,50), (5,20), (20,5), (50,2), where the first element 
refers to the (individual) life-ye~rs increase and the second element refers to 
the number of patients who received this increase. 
In any experiment of this kind it is important to analyse the extent to 
which the use of another technique provides similar results --consistency 
across methods. For this, after applying the choice-bracketing to all allo-
cations, we provided each participant with six cards that they had to ranIe 
from more to l~ preferred -direct ordering technique (DO). Each card cor-
responded to each of the previously assessed programs. The additional card 
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corresponded to that program in which life was increased by ten years for 
ten patients -(10,10). It did not make any sense to Illisess this allocation 
before because the ten-years increase was used to compare the rest. Finally. 
the participants were Illiked to briefiy justify their ranking. 
Two weeks latter. we organised a third meeting. The purpose was to check 
if the results are cOllBistent in time -temporal reliability (retest). Therefore, 
they had to repeat the experimento 
4.2 Method of analysis 
First, we excluded from our analysis those individuals that did not make 
trade--offs. If the participants do not make trade--offs the p* values obtained 
do not have any meaning. 
Next, from valuations of participants obtained with the PTO technique, 
we calculate the p* average value for each one of five time-increases and 
number of patients allocations. We verify if each of the five average p* are 
significantly different from the rest. Notice that if the AQM Illisumptions are 
correct then none of the allocations should have a significantly different value 
fraID 10. 
Based on the individual p*, we obtain the social value that each partici-
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pant assigned to the five increases in question. Given that for each allocation 
(t,p) we have obtained one p* value such that this allocation is equally pre--
ferred to the allocation (lO,p*), its social value should be the sarue. If we 
assume that the social value of increases in life-years is independent of pop-
ulation size (OIsen, 1994) we get 
It should be noted that this assumption is what allows us to arbitrarily 
choose the 5 values of p. In addition, given that all of the time increases 
are assessed in relation to a 1O-year-increase value, this can he established 
arbitrarily, therefore, we make u (10) = 10 and the social value of each time 
increase, t, is expressed as u (t) = 10 * p* /p. Lastly, we look for the nmc-
tional fonu, ú (t) 1 that best fits with these values. The aim is to obtain 
assessments for all those gains which were not direcUy assessed. Given that 
we want to avoid imposing any restrictions a priori, different regressions are 
estimated using Ordinary Least Squares until finding that which display a 
better goodness of fit. 
As mentioned, to verify the consistency across methods, we have used 
the DO in addiÜon to the PTO. While it is true that the ordering technique 
does not allow us to obtain cardinal values, the resulting rankings should 
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coincide with those obtained with PTO, at the individual level as well as 
at the social level -the latter if the method of aggregation is the same. 
For this, we transforrns the cardinal (individual) responses, obtained with 
PTO, to ordinal responses -ranking. To test the correlation between the 
two orderings at the individual level, Spearman rank correlation coefficient 
(SCC) was calculated for each participant. Then, we calculated the average 
sec of al! participants. 
In order to analyse the correlation at the sociallevel, the individual rank-
ings obtained by both techniques were aggregated using the Borda rule. In 
this way, two social orderings were obtained, denoted as S-PTO and S-DO. 
To assess the degree of coincidence between both orderings, we apply both 
Spearman and Kendall rank correlation coefficients. SCC and KCC are non-
parametric techniques which are applicable to ordinal data. Their values 
tie between -1 and 1, a higher value indicating stronger positive association 
hetween the ranks. The KCC is not used to evaluate the correlation on an 
individuallevel hecause it is necessary that any card has the sarue position 
in the ranking. However, it has been observed that this does not OCClll' at 
the individuallevel. 
Finally, to check temporal reliahility, we analyse the degree of individ-
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ual coincidence between the initial answers and those obtained two weeks 
later for the sarue questions. To analyse the correlation between the ranking 
from initial DO and that Olle from the retest, we use SCC. To analyse the 
correlation between the valuations resulting from initial PTO technique and 
that one from the retest, we calculate Pearson linear correlation coefficient 
(PCC). 
4.3 Results 
First, we excluded from our analysis those individuals that did not make 
trade-offs. We had to exclude 16 out oE the 61 participants (26%). Those 
people always chose the pairs with greater number of patients (10 partici-
pants) or the parrs with greater numher of years (6 participants). 
Table 1 shows the average assessment ~right column~ for each alloca-
tion of life-years increases and number of patients -displayed in the left-
obtained using the PTO technique. It should be noted that the assessment 
indicates the average number ofthe patients who would have to receive a ID--
healthy-life-year increase in order for the participants to become indifferent 
to the allocation, to the left. 
[insert table 1] 
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Once we have the average valuatioll, and before making sorne comments 
ahout results, we must carry out sorne contrasts tú lmow if these valuations 
are significantly different fraro Qile another. In the right columns, under the 
p* valu8, the t--8tudent statistic i8 shown which allows liS tú test whether the 
average vaIne 18 statisticaUy different fraro 10. As can be seen in the tableo 
the average vaInes are significant at a significance level of 95% except for the 
(20,5) allocation which i8 at 90%. To compare the remaining average values 
a mean difference contrast was done. Although not shown heTe, the oruy 
pairs whose differences i8 not statistically significant are [(2,50) (50, 2)] and 
[(5.20), (20, 5)]. 
Starting from the average assessments it is possible to analyse the dis-
tributive preferences. We must bear in mind that given two allocations 
(e,p') and (tll,pll), whosep* values arep*' audp*", respectively, the partici-
pauts prefer to distribute (concentrate) gains if when p' > pll then p*' > p*" 
(p*' < p*"). Table 1 show that they prefer to distribute gains when the indi-
vidual gain is "sufficiently" great and concentrate them when the individual 
gaiu ls small. For instance, they prefer to give 10 additional life--years a 10 
patients, that 20 additional life-years a 5 patients (preferences for distribu-
tion). However, they prefer to give 5 years to 20 patients that 1 year to 100 
20 
patients (preferences for concentrate). 
Based Oil the individual p*) we obtained the social value that each par-
ticipant assigns to each time increase ---u (t). Starting fram these values, we 
have estimated different functions in arder to look for the alle which best 
reflects the participants preferences. Amongst tested functions that ane that 
display a better goodness of fit i8 the u{4) functian, defined in the section 
3. To estimate this function, we transform it into a linear equation applying 
logarithms. In this way, we obtain 
The estimated equation is the following, 
1-;;-;;( t) - 0.807 - 0.026 t + 1.435 In t (":'11.05) (-5.67) (24.32) 
R2 0.86 
As can be seen, a11 the parameters are significant. The function explains 
86% of the total variability, wruch is a good result if we keep in mind the 
number of peopIe interviewed and the uncommon character oI the questions. 
Thls function combine a convex and concave sbape. Its properties are dis-
played in the n~t section. 
As far as the consistency across methods is concerned, table 2 sbows the 
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1 
1 
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S-PTO, the S-DO and -in the lower part- see and Kee between both 
rankings. In additioll, the average seo of aH participants is showed. Both 
methods provide similar orderings -therefore, a high correlation coefficients-
) suggesting a bigh consistency across methods both at the sociallevel and at 
the individuallevel Finally, we analysed the reliability of the results study-
ing temporal consistency. We get an average see of 0.93 between initial DO 
and that one froro the retest and an average pee of 0.44 between initial and 
final values obtained with PTO. This suggest a hlgh stability of preferences 
with regard to tbe ranking but a weaker stability witb regard to the values. 
[insert table 2] 
5 Discussion 
Trus experiment has allowed us to estimate the parameters of the social 
utility function fOI healthy life-years increases, whose values are showed in 
In u(t) equation. Writing trus equation in bis original form, we get 
The functional form of U(ti) lets liS analyse distributive preferences. Start-
ing frOID a simple derivation exercise we find that Ull (td is positive for t 
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values less than 9.09 and negative for the rest oí the viable values. Figure 
1 represents the function u(ti ). The function starts out being slightly COll-
vex, taking on a concave shape start with a certain vaIue that corresponds 
to t = 9,09. This information has very important qualitative implications. 
When the gains are lesB than 9,09 years, the average participant prefers to 
concentrate those gains, but if the gains are greater he prefers to distribute 
thern. In this way the assumption that the distributive preferences depend 
on health gains i8 supported in the sense that the participants prefer to dis-
tribute health gains as long as they provide a reasonable life--tiroe inerease 
and, on the other hand, they prefer to concentrate health gaíns rather than 
give insignifieant gains to roany people. 
[insert figure 1J 
Using this as a staxting point, we will be able to obtain the associated 
SWF value for any health eare program T = (tI, . . , tn ), expressed as follows, 
n n 
W (T) = I: ií(t¡) = 0.446 I: e -0.026 t, t/"43'. 
1=1 i=1 
As WagstafI, and Dolan report, the indifferenee curves of the SWF provide 
another interesting way to analyse distributive preferences. Figure 2 shows 
the indifference curves of W (7) supposing T = (tI, t2). Fa! individual values 
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less than 9.09 (area 1) we find concave indifference curves and, therefore, gains 
are preferred to be concentrated: given a total amount of health gains, the 
allocations that concentrate gains are always placed Oil a higher indifference 
curve than those which distribute them. Far larger increases (area II) we can 
point out convex indifference curves indicating preferences for mOfe equitable 
distribution. We cannot say anything a priori about (syrnmetrical) areas III 
and IV. Given that both areas combines gains where there is a preference 
for distribution with gains where there is a preference for concentration, the 
final result will depend on the specific gain in question. 
[insert figure 2J 
Following the tbeoretical exposition, the measures of absolute and re1ative 
inequaJity aversion --f:Ja and 8r respectively- were calculated. Obviously, 
both roeasures are negative for values l€.'ls than 9.09, indieative of the exis-
tenee of negative inequality aversion. Ftom this value, both parameters are 
positive and, therefore, there is positive inequality aversion. It is interesting 
to analyse the trajectory both these indicators follow. It lS easy to verify 
that dOa(ti)/dti and dOr(ti)/dt-j are positive for all ti analysed. Given that 
both eoeffieients are increasing with respect to the health gain, the greater 
the number oí years provided to each individual, the greater the inequality 
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aversion is. in both absolute and relative terIllS. 
6 Conclusion 
It has been suggested by a nurnber of economists that the distributive pref-
erences should be included in the social valuation of QALY s. In this paper, 
we have proposed a SWF that allows us to represent different social pref-
erences, including the additive ones proposed in the literature on QALYs 
until now. Moreover, this function lets us to combine preferences for COllcen-
tration and distributioll,an issue suggested by sorne authors, which had IlOt 
been formulated theoretically. 
The experiment results have confumed that participants have different 
distributive preferences depending on the individual life-years increase oh-
tained. Therefore, the set of SWF proposed until now ...... · ..·vPl ,U(2l and u{3l_ 
do not provide a suitable approximation of preferences for the group under 
study, given that these functions do not allow us to combine concave an 
convex sections of u (tJ 
However, it ~ important to stress the pilot nature of tbis experirnent and 
therefore its limitatiollB. On the one hand, we have chosen a convenient 
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sample but it i8 necessary tú select a more representative sample tú obtain 
more robustness in results. On the other hand, the u (t¡) estimated starts tú 
decrease for life-time increases bigger than 55 years. This i8 inconsistent with 
the monotonicity assumption -and with the common sense. However, this 
anomaly i8 not a limitation of the function propased but oí the experiment 
accomplished. It should be noted that the biggest increase oí time evaluated 
i8 40 years, then our results are only re1evant fo! time increases no bigger 
than 40 years. Finally, tú estimate u (td the lexiccgraphic participants have 
been excluded because they do not make trade-offs. Therefore, it should 
not be forgotten that the resulting function leaves the preferences of these 
participants unexplained. 
However, in spite of these limitations, we have covered the initial purpose 
of this paper: to asses the importance of distributive effects in social valuation 
of health gains and to what extent this importance can vary depending on 
the size of the gain. 
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Appendix 
Part of the questionnaire we used can be found below. Oue of the 5 time 
increase alld people allocations that the participants have assessed through 
the choice--bracketing is included as an example. 
In this section we will always show 2 treatments: A and B. The treatments 
are different from each ather in the increase of healthy life--years that are 
provided tú the patient) and in the number of people who receive gruns. We 
must bear in mind that a11 the patients are 20 years oId. You must say 
whether you prefer treatment A, treatment E, ar you are indifferent tú both. 
Depending Oil your choice the questionnaire continues in the following way: 
-If you chaos8 an optíon where you find the word "stop", circ1e the word 
and go Oil to the next table (in which treatment A has been varied). 
- If yau choose an option where you find the word "continue", go on to 
the next lineo 
By way of simplification we will use the following notation: 
Healthy life - year increases for the patient = "Years" 
Number of peopIe receiving gains = "People" 
1 prefer treatment A = "Pref. A" 
1 am indifferent to A and B = "Same" 
1 prefer treatment B = "Pref. E" 
The treatments are the following: 
Treaimeni A I I 1'reatment B 
Years People Years People Pref. A Same Pref. B 
5 20 10 1 continue stop stop 
5 20 10 20 stop stop continue 
5 20 10 3 continue stop stop 
5 20 10 18 stop stop continue 
5 20 10 5 continue stop stop 
5 20 10 15 stop stop continue 
5 20 10 8 continue stop stop 
5 20 10 12 stop stop continue 
5 20 10 10 stop stop stop 
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Table 1: Assessment of TIeatments 
Time, Patients Patient, (p') 
(statistic t) 
10,10 10 
20,5 9.23 (-1.90) 
5,20 8.93 
(-2.17) 
2,50 7.49 
(-2.99) 
50,2 7.40 
(-5.39) 
1,100 6.74 (-3.49) 
Table 2: Ranking of treatments 
(from more to less preferred) 
Time, Patients 
SPTO S DO 
10,10 10,10 
20,5 5,20 
5,20 20,5 
50,2 50,2 
2,50 2,50 
1,100 1,100 
KCC-0.86 SCC~0.94 
Individual SCC (average)-O.81 
30 
35 
30 
25 
20 
15 
U(t) 
10 
5 
5 10 15 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ w 
Life-time increase (years) 
Figure 1: Social value of life-time increase 
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Figure 2: Indifference curves of the estimated SVVF 
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